When Is A God Not A God?
Drew Tipson
From: "Drew Tipson"
To: "Positive Atheism" <editor@positiveatheism.org>
Sent: October 05, 2001 9:46 PM
Subject: RE: Positive_Atheism_Letters_Section
In the midst of a recent discussion about the meaning of the word atheism (arguing for the "weak" definition), I struck upon an interesting point.
The person I was talking with claimed that atheism meant claiming that no god exists, and then said "This is a claim and has to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and no atheist to this date has been able to do that."
My response to this was: "No atheist, qua atheism, has to! Atheism requires only non-belief; atheism does not require a counterclaim against theism. A person who happen to be an atheist might well make a claim that there is no god. It would then be their responsibility to prove that claim. However, their failure to do so would not prove that a god exists, nor would it relieve theists of their burden of proof to demonstrate their claim that a god exists."
All very well and good, a standard and important response. But then I realized that, in fact, there is nothing special about atheists in regard to being able to make claims that "god does not exist." Paul Tillich, for instance, a Christian theologian, is happy to conclude that his god does not, in fact, exist. So there can be nothing necessary or singular to atheism about an atheist claiming that "god does not exist." And many other theists also make these sorts of claims all the time: when talking about the gods of other theists. Some theists even claim it about their own god."
So, in this sense, Paul Tillich, the most unintelligible of Christian theologians, is really quite an ally to us: he is an example of a legitimate theist (he believes in his god) who makes the claim "god does not exist." Thus, that claim cannot be what is definitionally singular, distinct, and unique about "atheism."
Tolland-esque pantheists also throw an interesting perspective into the mix. They believe in their god (existence), but many are empiricists. To wit, they don't take existence as an empirical claim to be proven, but rather simply as an axiom (since it cannot be proven that anything exists, it's simply an assumption that is required to have any basis for claiming anything). So, in a sense, it doesn't matter if the universe "really exists" or not: it's still their god regardless. Empiricist pantheists believe in their god subjectively, by definition, not by making actual truth claims. They, again, do not need to claim that their god exists, and could even claim otherwise without losing their status as a theist (though in practice, it makes even less sense to claim that existence doesn't exist).
From: "Positive Atheism" <editor@positiveatheism.org>
To: "Drew Tipson"
Subject: Re: Positive_Atheism_Letters_Section
Date: October 06, 2001 12:26 AM
A person who happen to be an atheist might well make a claim that there is no god. It would then be their responsibility to prove that claim
This is not even entirely true. The Burden of Proof, as I understand it, holds for existential claims (among other things) and the claim that a god exists is an existential claim. Thus, since the one making the claim that something exists is the one who must bring the strong argument.
The Burden of Proof, as I understand it, also holds for claims that challenge a widely held position: since most of us hold to the sphericity of the Earth, then anybody who wishes to posit a flat Earth has the burden of proof. This is why most Skeptics place the Burden of Proof upon the Holocaust Deniers, even though we (Holocaust affirmers) are making the existential claim -- that the Holocaust existed as a historical event. Even then, it's a relatively simple matter to show that the Holocaust story that we have, the one that we continue to tell, is pretty close to the truth.
So, in a sense, it doesn't matter if the universe "really exists" or not: it's still their god regardless.
While I do not think it is the observer's anthropologist's role to second-guess what the subject will or will not call a "god," I still balk at these kinds of definitions. It opens the door to the Fundamentalist Christian telling me that because I submit to liberal scientific method, therefore science is my "god." When they do this, even if they have Toland in mind, I still accuse them of of the dishonest rhetorical fallacy called equivocation (using two different meanings for the same word in the same context).
I will, however, grant the label of "theist" to anybody who uses theistic language simply because it is not my role as observer to accept or reject certain definitions for the word god. This was my point in "The Semantic Dance of Pantheism" even though I am not entirely consistent in that I will go ahead and call Anton LaVey's brand of Satanism a form of atheism.
George H. Smith, Why God? in his latest book, makes an excellent case that we're really dealing in some gray areas, here, but I feel that an atheist who is trying to decide just how far his or her atheism reaches does well to at least try to hammer this one out -- even though there are likely to be no hard and fast answers for this one.
From: "Drew Tipson"
To: "Positive Atheism" <editor@positiveatheism.org>
Subject: RE: Positive_Atheism_Letters_Section
Date: October 09, 2001 8:30 PM
So, in a sense, it doesn't matter if the universe "really exists" or not: it's still their god regardless.
While I do not think it is the observer's (or anthropologist's) role to second-guess what the subject will or will not call a "god," I still balk at these kinds of definitions. It opens the door to the Fundamentalist Christian telling me that because I submit to liberal scientific method, therefore science is my "god." When they do this, even if they have Toland in mind, I still accuse them of Equivocation (using two different meanings for the same word in the same context).
I agree: I don't think their usage would be legitimate even with Tolland in mind. For a Tolland-esque pantheist, the universe is their god because it fits their criteria for deification (it is omnipotent, omniscient, etc.) in a way that is maddeningly much more intelligible and true than the Fundamentalist Christian's claims about these similar qualities being part of their god). It is not your god, because it does not fit your criteria for god. The Fundamentalist Christian is still using equivocation: because using the schema Tolland-esque sense of god requires one to give credence to the definition held by the person in question. Almost by definition, science cannot be your god unless you say it is. That is the how the subjective logic of Tolland-esque thinking works: something is a god only subjectively, not objectively. Anything else and the theist simply isn't playing the same game anymore, in which case all bets are off again.
But I still think it's pretty useful and significant that, when defending the weak definition of atheism as being the clearest and most useful, we can, by referencing Tillich, point out that denying the existence of god is not an act that is characteristic of atheists alone: theists can do it too, even in regards to their own god. The only truly unique characteristic left is simple non-belief: the definition of the weak position. While a particular atheist can certainly claim to be able to prove the non-existence of a particular god (and with certain gods, they can do so pretty convincingly), the broad root of atheism is still simply unbelief. Disproof isn't necessary, and even if disproof fails, atheism itself is not in any way imperiled. Disproof is simply something that someone (atheist or theist) happens to do -- it is not fundamental to atheism. It is no more inherently "atheist" than communism is, even though historically, atheists have been the most associated with providing disproofs (however, plenty of theists provide disproofs of each other's gods, which, in effect, differs little from what some atheists do).
This also helps us to explore some of the problems caused by muddling the distinctions between two different meanings of the word believe. These definitions would be (1) believe in, meaning the giving of your trust and loyalty to something or someone, that is, devoting yourself to it, versus (2) believe in, as in asserting the existence of something. Many theists often play these entirely different words against each other: "I believe in god's existence (meaning 2) because I believe in god, giving him my loyalty having found him trustworthy (meaning 1); therefore, how can you not believe in god (both meanings mashed awkwardly together)!?
From: "Positive Atheism Magazine" <editor@positiveatheism.org>
To: "Drew Tipson"
Subject: Re: Positive_Atheism_Letters_Section
Date: October 09, 2001 11:43 AM
Thanks!
The most common example of equivocation that we get is the one which confuses various meanings of the word faith or its verb, to believe. The popular "MO" is to accuse atheists of having faith and generally goes something like this: "Don't tell me you don't have faith , of course you have faith! You have faith that this building you're in will not crumble down on top of us." The flaw here is the fact that the "faith" I denied having is religious faith: that "saving faith" in Jesus (or whatever) which distinguishes religious faith from all other kinds.
Cliff Walker
Positive Atheism Magazine
Six years of service to
people with no reason to believe